Economics of Crime: a study from the perspective of New Institutional Economics

This book analyzes the relationship between New Institutional Economics and the Economics of Crime, investigating how formal and informal institutions influence the organization of illicit activities and the decision-making processes of criminal agents. Through an interdisciplinary approach between Law and Economics, the study discusses transaction costs, bounded rationality, information asymmetry, opportunistic behavior, enforcement, and game theory, demonstrating that illicit markets also operate according to rules, incentives, sanctions, and their own governance mechanisms. By examining criminality as an economic and institutional phenomenon, the book shows that criminal organizations reduce uncertainty, impose internal discipline, and structure relations of trust through punishment and coercion. Based on national and international literature, especially Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, Ronald Coase, and Gary Becker, the book contributes to the debate on more effective criminal public policies, capable of altering incentives, reducing the economic advantages of crime, and strengthening institutional responses.